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SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE

ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE TO HAITI

Note by the Secretary-General

1. The attached document, which is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 45/2 of 10 October 1990, contains the second and final report of the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH).

2. It will be recalled that the first report of ONUVEH (A/45/870, annex) described the electoral process in Haiti and the Group's contribution to it up to the eve of the first round of elections, which was to take place on 16 December 1990. The present report, after providing further information about the organization of the elections, describes the conduct of the first round, together with certain supplementary elections held in some districts on 6 January 1991 and the second and final round, which took place in most districts on 20 January. ONUVEH activities at various stages of the electoral process are also described. The report concludes with an evaluation of the electoral process, as observed by ONUVEH.

3. With the completion of the second round of elections, the mandate of ONUVEH came to an end and its personnel have now all left Haiti. The newly elected President, Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was duly inaugurated on 7 February 1991.

4. ONUVEH thus fulfilled the task attributed to it by resolution 45/2, namely, to provide the broadest possible support to the Government of Haiti in connection with the elections in that country. I would like to take this opportunity to express warm appreciation to the Governments that contributed electoral and security observers to ONUVEH and to pay tribute to my Personal Representative, Mr. João Augusto de Medicis, and to all those who served in ONUVEH under his leadership for their success in assisting the people of Haiti to elect a Government of their own choice.

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ANNEX

Second report of the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The first report of the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) to the General Assembly covered the period from the beginning of voter registration to 14 December 1990, i.e., the end of the election campaign preceding the first round of the general elections. The purpose of the present report is to describe the end of the electoral process in Haiti and in particular the conditions in which balloting took place on 16 December 1990, 6 January 1991 and 20 January 1991, together with the results of the presidential and legislative elections and the local elections. The report ends with some conclusions on the Haitian electoral process as a whole, as observed by ONUVEH.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE ELECTIONS

A. Characteristics of the elections

2. On 16 December 1990, 3,227,155 Haitian voters were asked to choose:

(a) A President of the Republic from among 11 approved candidates;

(b) 27 senators from among 119 approved candidates;

(c) 83 deputies from among 337 approved candidates;

(d) 135 three-member municipal councils from among 534 approved ones;

(e) 565 three-member administrative councils of the communal sections (CASECs) from among 1,539 approved ones. 1/

The Constitution provides that the President of the Republic, the deputies and the senators are to be elected by uninominal balloting in two rounds and that an absolute majority of voters 2/ is required in the first round. In the second round, the Constitution limits the number of contending candidates to double the number of seats remaining to be filled. On the other hand, candidates to the municipal councils and the CASECs are elected by list and balloting is by relative majority.

3. The names of all the candidates to a single elective office had to appear on one ballot-paper and the voter marked the candidate or candidates or list of his choice. The presidential ballot-paper therefore listed the 11 approved candidates with their photographs, giving in each case the candidate's name, the acronym or abbreviation of his party or alliance, his number and his emblem. Under each number was printed a white circle on a black background in which the voter could

put a cross. The other ballot-papers had no photographs, which was a matter of regret to some; however, printing the photographs of thousands of candidates would undoubtedly have been a long, costly and complex process. In the case of the elections to the Senate, the voter had to choose three candidates, which made the voting and the subsequent counting of the votes relatively complex.

B. Precautions against fraud

4. As may be recalled, the unexpected success of the voter registration exercise, which resulted in the registration of more potential voters than there were persons of voting age, according to the estimates of the statisticians, gave rise to the fear that some Haitians had registered more than once. Accordingly, to prevent voters from voting more than once, the Interim Electoral Council (CEP) provided indelible ink in which each voter had to dip his thumb after voting.

5. To discourage intimidation and all other forms of possible fraud, the CEP encouraged representatives of the various political parties and foreign observers to be present at the voter registration and polling stations (BIVs). The political parties or groups had to send to the departmental boards of elections (BEDs) a copy of their list of delegates so that accreditation could be issued by the board concerned. Accreditation was for a specific BIV. Thus, the procedure was simple and encouraged the nomination of numerous party representatives. The international observers had to be invited by the President of the Republic or the CEP and accredited by the CEP, which was required to provide each observer with an identity card. The CEP issued 1,618 observer cards. Even if the cards were not always used, it is evident that the CEP sought to make the elections as transparent and as internationally credible as possible.

C. Material preparations for the elections

6. Material preparations for the elections included: setting up an adequate number of polling stations with well-trained staff; preparing appropriate instructions and publishing manuals for the staff in charge of the polling stations; drawing up the voting procedure to be followed and making it known to the public; distributing to the polling stations the materials required for the balloting (ballot-papers, ballot-boxes, polling-booths, ink, etc.); transmitting the results and processing them electronically in order to have the preliminary results and the final outcome reasonably fast. Since the challenging of candidacies monopolized the attention of the CEP in the weeks before the elections, the organization of the balloting was delayed. In addition, it was a highly decentralized exercise.

7. As to the sites for the balloting, most of the polling stations occupied the same premises as the stations set up for voter registration. However, some owners who had agreed to let their premises for the purposes of voter registration refused to do so in the case of the elections proper. This occurred, for example, at Delmas, the Port-au-Prince district in which the headquarters of the Union pour la réconciliation nationale (URN) is located, where new premises were not found until the day before the elections.

8. Since the number of employees who had registered the voters was insufficient, other staff had to be recruited. From 24,000 during the period of registration, their number increased to more than 70,000 on the day of the elections. The recruitment of staff for the BIVs posed many problems. The inability to find suitable staff was due mainly to two factors connected with Haiti's political situation. At the beginning of the electoral process, few were true believers in the elections. Moreover, the memory of the violence which had marked the election campaign and the elections of 29 November 1987 still haunted the potential candidates and were an undoubted impediment. In the poorer areas, however, where people were deeply affected by the economic difficulties, participation in the BIVs, even though the pay was very low, was perceived as a source of revenue which offset potential risks. Of course, this sector of the population was not the best equipped for the work which had to be done, and this caused difficulties to which we shall revert later.

9. As to the planning and design of the activities at the BIV level, it should be stated that there was no systematic testing of the voting procedures and no one made a time-and-motion study on which to base the instructions and the manuals. The resulting improvisation, together with a clear lack of electoral experience on the part of the CEP staff, meant that some of the documents and procedures pertaining to the elections were not fully satisfactory. This was particularly true at the counting stage. The French guidelines for the counting of votes were highly official documents whose authors had not taken into account the level of education of the users, and their contents sometimes contradicted the guidelines in Creole on the same subject. The forms for the returns also had design flaws; for example, the BIV staff were themselves required to write in information which could easily have been printed in advance (names of the candidates to the presidency, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies). Some of the decisions on the voting process were taken very late, the instructions in Creole and the graphic materials were issued too close to the elections to have a sufficiently broad impact. In addition, the members of the BIVs were inadequately trained. Had the training been given in time and been more thorough, it would have filled some of the gaps left by the guidelines and given the staff a better understanding of the forms for the returns.

10. One of the most delicate aspects of the electoral arrangements, on which the success of the elections depended to a great extent, was the distribution of the electoral materials and, after the elections, the transmission of data to the CEP for the preliminary determination of results and the transport of the electoral materials to the BEDs. As was stated in the first report, the printing and distribution of the ballot-papers was delayed by the challenging of the candidacies, a period which had to elapse before the CEP could provide the printers with the final list of candidates. Hence, there remained little time, certainly less time than had originally been planned, for the distribution of the electoral materials.

11. The distribution of the electoral materials was a highly decentralized process. The ballot-papers and the rest of the materials were provided to the nine departments, which assumed the responsibility for planning and carrying out distribution at the communal level, while the communal delegates were required to

organize distribution at the BIV level. No systematic instructions regarding distribution were issued by the CEP. Consequently, the efficacy of the distribution process depended principally on the initiatives taken by the Chairmen of the BEDs. Owing to the very late start of the distribution process, frequent use was made of helicopters for transportation, and this required some central planning on the basis of needs indicated by the BED employees. Three helicopters were provided under a United Nations technical assistance project, a fourth helicopter was supplied by the Haitian Armed Forces and a fifth by the Jamaican Air Force.

12. Pursuant to article 109 of the Electoral Act, a preliminary ballot count was made at the BIV level, where the results were recorded on a return form and posted immediately on the BIV door. The BIV then sent a copy of the return to the BED and the CEP by telegram or some other means. Subsequently, the Chairman of the BIV, accompanied by delegates from the two political parties which received the most votes in the presidential elections, went to the communal board of elections (BEC). He left there the materials used for the functioning of the BIV (polling-booths, ballot-boxes, ink, etc.). The Chairman of the BEC was required to provide, as soon as possible, the necessary transport facilities to take the Chairman of the BIV and the election documents (electoral rolls, returns, ballot-papers) to the BED headquarters. The BED checked the count for each BIV, transmitted the results to the CEP and posted a copy of the results on its main door.

13. For the purposes of the tally, the CEP had a relatively powerful electronic system with 48 terminals, which had been given by the United States Agency for International Development (US/AID) through the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and which had been used for voter registration. At the outset, the intention had been to use the system to add up the results. However, the subcontractor responsible for preparing the software was unable to supply the latter until two or three days before the elections. Because of the hazard to which such a delicate operation was subject, the technical assistance project, with the aid of two experts from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) system, devised a parallel system based on 12 personal computers, for use in an emergency, to calculate the results of the presidential election. Naturally, the system could be, and was, used as an additional means of control.

D. Election-day security measures

14. One of the tasks of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Security of Electoral Activities (CCSAE) was to draw up a national electoral security plan. Since the day of the first round of balloting was considered to be the most critical from the standpoint of security, special arrangements were called for. The CCSAE accordingly defined operational priorities and proposed a series of emergency measures to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. All of them were set out in a comprehensive operational order issued to all branches of the Haitian Armed Forces. The general terms of this order were as follows:

(a) Broad discretion was left to the military departmental commanders in the conduct of operations, although in conjunction with highly centralized information;

(b) Priority was given to the metropolitan area by the assignment to the capital of all military forces based there (including the Navy, the Air Force and the Signal Corps);

(c) The troops were to maintain an impeccable attitude based on respect for the electoral legislation, non-use of arms, impartiality, and co-operation with the population and the observers;

(d) The military authorities were to make use of the media to explain the emergency measures and dispense useful advice to the population.

15. The departmental commanders, who have full responsibility for maintaining order within their respective departments and whose resources barely suffice to meet the needs in normal times, had to make some redeployments, taking forces away from some regions to strengthen others. The district commanders, in addition, took many steps to guarantee the impartiality and loyalty of their troops and to reassure the local population. Meetings were held, for instance, between the civil and military authorities on election security.

III. CONDUCT OF THE FIRST ROUND OF THE ELECTIONS

A. Elections free of violence

16. Although the election campaign was conducted peacefully, except for the attack of 5 December 1990 referred to in paragraph 81 of the first report of ONUVEH (A/45/870, annex), the memory of the aborted elections of 29 November 1987 was fresh in the minds of Haitians. At that time, shooting had been heard in Port-au-Prince throughout the night before election day, and the day itself, it will be recalled, was marked by the early-morning ruelle Vaillant massacre. Nothing of the sort happened on 16 December 1990. After a calm night, the voters, determined to vote, began appearing at dawn at their respective polling stations, and the day ended without the least episode of violence having occurred. Not only was no terrorist act committed, but the population showed remarkable patience and discipline under difficult circumstances. The most that happened was that a candidate for the presidency complained of having been shoved. This indicates the climate of security in which the first round of the general elections took place.

B. Adequately staffed polling stations

17. We saw that, prior to the elections, the Haitian electoral bodies recruited the staff needed for the proper functioning of the BIVs on election day. Staff were, in fact, present at the stations as of 6 a.m. There were very few stations that were not fully manned. We have not received overall statistics from the CEP, but according to the data gathered by the observers in over 1,800 BIVs, the Chairman was absent in only 18 instances, the Secretary in 15, and the other staff - employees, door attendants - were missing in only a very small proportion of the polling stations. These staff, who were paid, were not always the best qualified for the task. Owing to their lack of training, combined with the already

mentioned complexity of the procedures and the very poor conditions under which the vote count often took place (lack of space, poor lighting, etc.) a number of the return forms were not filled in satisfactorily. However, as a general rule, it can be said that the problems that occurred at the time of the voting were due more to the lack of electoral materials than to inexperience, let alone incompetence, on the part of those in charge of the BIVs.

C. Problems in the distribution of electoral materials

18. Given the complicated logistics of distributing electoral materials to the 14,000 BIVs in good time for election day, it was expected that there would be some problems with the availability of the materials, particularly in the more inaccessible polling stations. Such problems did, in fact, occur in many areas across the country during the first hours of the voting. However, in many of these separate instances, they were settled in a relatively short time, thanks to rapid and resolute action by the electoral authorities in most of the departments. Only Nord-Ouest and Ouest departments (whose chief towns are, respectively, Port-de-Paix and Port-au-Prince) experienced serious problems the causes of which have not yet been fully explained.

19. In Ouest, the greatest difficulties arose not in the rural areas but in certain heavily populated urban areas. Although not all the details of the problems encountered in distributing the ballot-papers are available, and probably never will be, they cannot be attributed to the inaccessibility of the polling stations, and one is forced to ascribe them to deficiencies in planning and organization. Some examples can be cited that seem to indicate clearly that the latter are overriding factors. President Carter and the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General had each informed the CEP that their first visit, on the morning of the elections, would be to the BIV of ruelle Vaillant, site of the 1987 massacre. The President of the CEP had also registered to vote at that polling station. He telephoned the Chairman of the Ouest BED in order to inform him that the aforementioned persons would be coming and to ask him to prepare to receive them. The following morning, the reception had been organized but some of the electoral materials were missing, and the voters had to wait until 10 a.m. to begin voting.

20. The ruelle Vaillant anecdote sheds light only on the level of organization at the Ouest BED. But more worrisome was the fact that some electoral materials were missing for a considerable length of time, a situation which could have seriously undermined the electoral process. In several of the poorer neighbourhoods (Cité-Soleil, Marché Salomon, Carrefour-Feuilles), ballot-papers were unavailable at practically all of the polling stations, affecting a population of close to 250,000. The situation was all the more dangerous in that the areas involved were ones in which Father Aristide was virtually assured of victory, and their inhabitants could have interpreted the lack of ballot-papers as a fraudulent manoeuvre against their candidate. Angry crowds began to assemble, particularly in Cité-Soleil, where the demonstration was on the verge of degenerating when a small police contingent with anti-riot equipment arrived on the scene. Fortunately, both sides showed great restraint, and the people heeded the police appeal to give the

authorities time to settle the problem. Around 2 p.m., the ballot-papers were finally found and transported to the BIVs, and the crowds stood calmly in line while awaiting their turn to vote.

21. Sporadic but real problems also occurred in the Artibonite and Nord-Ouest, but in the rest of the country, more often than not, no major difficulties were experienced as regards the presidential election. In some places, ballot-papers failed to arrive for other elections. Citizens were unable to vote for deputies in 3 electoral districts, and for local representatives in 34 communes and 140 communal sections. In the case of the deputies, who under the Constitution are elected in the first round only if they have received more than 50 per cent of the votes, the Council organized another first round on 6 January. In the case of the magistrates and the members of the CASECs, who are elected by simple majority, the elections were postponed until the second round on 20 January.

D. Secrecy of the ballots and lack of intimidation

22. The secrecy of the ballot was not always strictly respected. For one thing, the cardboard polling-booths, behind which the voters often had to crouch to fill out their ballot-papers, were sometimes set up in such a way that inquisitive eyes could see what was happening inside. For another, some voters asked the BIV staff to help them to vote for the candidate of their choice, whose name they did not hesitate to disclose. Nevertheless, violations of the secrecy of the ballot, whether deliberate or not, happened in only a few instances and at no time bore the mark of organized fraud.

23. The very fact that some voters turned to BIV members to ask them how to vote for a given candidate shows clearly that each voter felt free to vote as he saw fit. Nowhere did the ONUVEH observers witness attempts to intimidate the voters, nor were they indirectly informed of such attempts. This is a remarkable fact that deserves to be emphasized. No constraint seems to have been put on the voters at the time of the voting.

E. Monitoring arrangements

24. One of the most important means of ensuring that no one voted twice was marking one of the fingers of the voter with ink after the vote. The fact that there was no ink in a few polling stations resulted more from logistical and planning problems than from a scheme to evade monitoriing. The location of the stations where ink was unavailable did not follow any logical pattern.

25. Another important deterrent was the presence in the BIVs of party delegates to monitor electoral operations. We have not received sufficient information from the CEP or the parties, but the reports made by the ONUVEH observer teams who visited more than 1,800 BIVs indicate that in only 8.9 per cent of the BIVs was there no delegate present, that the Alliance nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (ANDP) was present in 44 per cent of them, the Front national pour le changement et la démocratie (FNCD) in 67.9 per cent, and the other parties in 67.6 per cent. The

ANDP complained that its representatives had not been permitted to enter a great many of the BIVs, particularly in Centre and Ouest departments. It even pointed out that in Ouest department their accreditation had been transferred to the FNCD. The CEP maintained that the applications had been submitted too late, but that steps would be taken in the second round to do more to facilitate the participation of party delegates.

F. Voter behaviour in the polling stations

26. The ballot itself took place under satisfactory conditions. Long queues formed in the morning, and the voters waited patiently. The ONUVEH mission received no report of any major incident at places where votes were being cast, although, as was seen earlier, instances of tension occurred when the arrival of electoral materials was considerably delayed. As the day progressed, the voting procedure grew more efficient, so much so that, as closing-time approached, the vast majority of the polling stations had no queue of voters. Only a few BIVs had to stay open after 6 p.m., the official time at which the polls closed, in order to allow people still waiting to vote to do so.

G. Security on election day

27. The mandate of the CCSAE did not envisage a role for it in directing operations on election day. However, after making a recommendation to this effect to the high command, the Committee became a veritable command post on polling day. This post was commanded by the general in charge of General Headquarters operations, with the CCSAE acting as operational headquarters for the occasion. One of the Committee's officers was assigned to the President of the CEP to ensure constant liaison between the electoral authorities and the military authorities. If the situation had deteriorated, this officer could have appeared on radio and television, along with the electoral authorities, to make a statement.

28. As was mentioned earlier, the main incidents were related to the absence of ballot-papers in many polling stations, particularly in the capital city. Throughout the day, the CCSAE had to make specific recommendations to departmental commanders on how to deal with demonstrations of ill feeling on the part of frustrated voters. The demonstration which took place at Cité-Soleil in the capital city was contained without violence, thanks to a constant dialogue between the forces of law and order, the electoral authorities, the population and observers. In this connection, the CCSAE was in permanent contact with the security observers' command post and the ONUVEH representative to the CEP.

29. At the local level, the military units deployed the day before the elections were reinforced in sensitive areas by troops who would normally have been centralized and who were mainly used as mobile patrols between those areas. Their presence had a positive influence on the attitude of the local forces of law and order and reassured the population. After the ballot count, the soldiers sometimes provided an escort for those in charge of transporting the ballot-papers and the returns.

IV. ACTIVITIES OF ONUVEH

A. Activities of ONUVEH: electoral observation

30. At the start of the mission, a first group of 39 French-speaking electoral observers, most of whom had acquired experience in Namibia or Nicaragua, were deployed to ONUVEH regional offices around the country to observe and report back on the conduct of voter registration and the election campaign. The day before the first round of the elections, these observers were joined by a further 50 electoral observers from the United Nations system and 35 observers designated by 13 participant countries. Still more observers were chosen from among members of the international communities of the United Nations and the non-partisan non-governmental organizations operating in the country, to increase the number of teams in the field on election day. In response to ONUVEH appeals, 69 people volunteered their assistance, of whom 31 were staff members of UNDP and other United Nations agencies in Haiti and 38 were representatives of non-governmental organizations. In addition to their knowledge of Haiti, most of these observers offered the great advantage of speaking Creole, which is still the language spoken by the vast majority of Haitians. The combination of these locally recruited international volunteers with overseas electoral observers made the teams assigned to the various urban and rural areas (20 per cent and 80 per cent, respectively) extremely effective at very little cost. (See the list of nationalities represented in annex I.)

31. For election day, the mission was able to obtain 40 additional vehicles from United Nations agencies in Haiti, the Swiss Embassy and a non-governmental organization to supplement its existing fleet of 82 vehicles. It also had to buy a fairly comprehensive emergency medical kit for each team, as well as sleeping bags, mosquito nets and coolers for observers deployed to remote locations. The logistics of finding accommodation for observers in the field were complex, for places had to be found in more than 40 small villages for them to spend Saturday and Sunday nights. ONUVEH had planned to make extensive use of helicopters to deploy and redeploy observers. However, the CEP had to use the helicopters in Nord and the Artibonite to meet urgent needs on election day. As a result, ONUVEH was left with one helicopter in Sud, and that for little more than five hours.

32. Communications were provided by an extensive network installed by field operations service personnel. This network consisted of 7 relay stations, 14 base stations, 70 mobile radios installed in vehicles, 125 portable radios assigned to electoral and security observers, 3 satellite ground stations at Port-au-Prince, Hinche and Fort-Liberté, 14 facsimile machines and 4 generators set up in regions with serious electric supply problems. On election day, the radio communications essential to projecting the results were relayed by 5 regional control stations in strategic locations throughout the country.

33. In all, 193 observers from 43 different countries spanning the five continents were deployed throughout the country on election day, including to extremely remote and inaccessible locations which could be reached only by helicopter or donkey or on foot. Between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m., when polling stations closed, they observed and reported on the conduct of elections at 1,813 BIVs, approximately 10 per cent

of them at the request of one or other of the main political parties or of the CEP itself, in politically sensitive areas. They provided excellent services throughout the day. The form used for observing the elections is reproduced in annex II. At the end of the day, observers went to their assigned sampling point, helped count the presidential vote and transmitted the results to headquarters. Some 30 people also provided logistical support, operating the communication system and providing liaison at the regional offices.

B. Activities of ONUVEH: security observation

34. From 30 November 1990 onwards, security observers concentrated their efforts on "sensitive areas", indentified as such in terms of past and present problems, relations between the army and the population and the possible presence of extremist elements. Security observers were redeployed in order to cover these areas as thoroughly as possible. On election day, they accompanied their Haitian counterparts wherever they went. In consultation with the electoral authorities and escorted by mobile military teams, they helped distribute any electoral materials that were lacking. They also helped election officials calm voters frustrated by delay in the arrival of these materials at some BIVs. The simultaneous presence of the military authorities, the electoral authorities and ONUVEH officials at polling stations that were experiencing problems made it much easier to keep order and ensure the proper conduct of the electoral process.

C. Projection of the results

35. Under article 109 of the Electoral Act, ballots are counted at the BIV, where a return is prepared. The fact that the ballots are counted at the BIVs and that political parties are provided with a copy of the documents is one of the best guarantees against fraud. Since the preliminary count is highly decentralized and is carried out in many different places, it is very difficult to organize massive fraud at this stage. Fraud is much easier at the stage when ballot-boxes are being transported and guarded, or when the various partial results are being added up.

36. Since it was impossible, with the limited number of observers available, to cover these latter stages, ONUVEH, in a joint operation with the Organization of American States (OAS), made a "quick count" (a projection of the results based on a limited number of observations covering a representative sample of polling stations) as had been done in Nicaragua. Projection of the results is a key element of the verification process. Thus, with information collected from relatively reliable sources (results at individual BIVs) the final results can be estimated with an appropriate degree of accuracy. If massive fraud occurred during stages of the process that were more difficult to monitor, it would be possible to detect it and to take appropriate action by expressing reservations about the electoral process or refusing to endorse it.

37. The projection of the results was based on a sample of 150 BIVs chosen at random and comprising some 36,000 voters out of a total of 3.2 million. A limited number of substitutions were made for BIVs that were either inaccessible or located

in places from which it was impossible to communicate the results. Half of the BIVs in the sample were covered by OAS teams and half by ONUVEH teams. Each team was responsible for noting the results of the presidential election in the sample BIV to which it was assigned and transmitting them to Port-au-Prince. There, the results were processed using a simple model for extrapolating from a random sample with a margin of reliability of 99.9 per cent. A programme had been designed for verifying the quality and the coherence/validity of the data and all the programmes were tested on simulated populations and sample data to calibrate and verify them and to refine the statistical methods used.

38. Given the state of the country's roads, most sample BIVs were somewhat inaccessible and 42 per cent of the teams had to spend one or two nights in rural areas, away from departmental capitals. The "quick count" therefore required thorough logistical preparation, which each regional team completed efficiently. The communication network functioned remarkably well and by 9.30 p.m. ONUVEH headquarters had received data from 71 out of 75 BIVs, with only 4 BIVs having experienced technical problems.

39. At around 9.45 p.m., the model began to produce serviceable estimates, and less than two hours later the following results were available:

Projection of the results

(Voting percentages obtained on the basis of ballots cast)

Candidate	Estimated results	Margin of error	Range	
			Minimum	Maximum
J. B. Aristide	66.4	6.0	60.5	72.4
Marc Bazin	13.2	4.0	9.2	17.1
Louis Déjoie II	3.3	1.9	1.4	5.3
Sylvio Claude	2.5	1.1	1.4	3.6
Thomas Désulmé	1.5	1.4	0.1	2.9
Other candidates	6.1	3.4	2.7	9.5
Invalid ballots	7.0	1.9	5.1	9.0
Abstentions	33.1	4.4	28.6	37.5

40. Among the various operations to verify the proper conduct of the elections, that of making a quick count on the basis of a representative sample deserves particular attention. This operation enabled ONUVEH to obtain early, reliable information and to communicate the results of the projection immediately to the main candidates and the Electoral Council. This was not just an act of courtesy; it was also intended to show them that the international community was aware of the overall trends in the results and thereby to discourage any thought of manoeuvres designed to distort these trends. In Haiti's case, the importance of this third function is particularly noteworthy, for the results of the presidential elections were accepted and congratulations were extended to the winner long before the CEP issued its first communiqués. The fact that the elected candidate was informed by ONUVEH of the projected results also encouraged dialogue and a relationship of trust.

V. ELECTIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES AND THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST ROUND

A. Transportation of electoral materials and calculation of the results

41. The transportation of the returns and ballot-papers posed the same type of problems as the distribution of electoral materials. Again, the least efficient departments were the Artibonite and Ouest. Despite repeated warnings from some members of the CEP, the Ouest BED had made no arrangements for receiving electoral materials, with the result that by shortly after midnight a host of BIV chairmen had gathered in front of the small entrance to the BED offices. Confusion reigned and many boxes containing both ballot-papers and returns were handed in to the CEP rather than to the Ouest BED. Problems also arose in other departments, but were dealt with more effectively than in Ouest. The other difficulty encountered by the electoral system was the existence of a large number of illegible returns, many of which were taken from the boxes containing ballot-papers. In many cases these boxes did not bear a BIV number by which to identify them, making it impossible to conduct a second ballot count.

42. These problems caused considerable delay in the publication of the first official results. It was only by Monday evening that the first results of the presidential elections, covering 10,000 voters, were made public. By 10 p.m. on Tuesday, the CEP was still unable to provide results for more than a tenth of the voters. Here it should be noted that, although the Constitution and the Electoral Act require an absolute majority of the votes, the CEP published only the number of votes received by each candidate, at no time giving information on invalid ballots or the total number of votes. Finally, on 24 December, eight days after the elections, the Electoral Council officially announced the victory of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

43. The final results of the presidential elections were published late in the afternoon of 11 January. They were as follows:

Candidate	Sud	Sud-Est	Grande Anse	Quest	Centre	Artibo-nite	Nord	Nord-Est	Nord-Quest	Total	%
T. Désulmé	2 552	3 310	2 355	6 772	3 934	4 291	1 476	1 104	1 568	27 362	1.67
Fritz Simon	1 077	1 020	1 354	2 062	1 392	1 165	980	490	577	10 117	0.62
Marc Bazin	16 404	16 138	24 384	36 940	38 516	36 196	29 251	13 862	21 586	233 277	14.22
R. Theodore	3 659	3 657	4 251	5 319	3 370	3 954	3 205	1 429	1 211	30 064	1.83
J. B. Aristide	137 720	101 539	129 647	352 524	74 476	114 250	122 976	42 346	36 647	1 107 125	67.48
R. V. Jeanty	1 312	1 347	1 914	2 503	1 477	1 261	1 574	510	398	12 296	0.75
F. Latortue	1 128	1 879	1 932	2 225	2 420	1 343	2 647	1 080	406	15 060	0.92
S. Claude	4 437	2 983	7 016	10 822	6 837	8 140	3 782	741	4 391	49 149	3.00
H. de Ronceray	4 239	5 412	4 029	28 265	3 735	2 635	3 247	945	2 364	54 871	3.34
V. R. Joseph	2 383	2 309	3 635	4 055	2 223	2 303	2 735	856	852	21 351	1.30
Louis Dejoie	30 555	7 353	13 953	8 874	5 449	6 024	5 129	1 522	1 198	80 057	4.88
Total	200 466	146 947	194 470	460 361	143 838	181 562	177 002	64 885	71 198	1 640 729	100.00
Registered voters	307 436	216 099	288 987	1 115 132	241 824	481 036	358 824	120 115	147 782	3 271 155	
Per cent of registered voters	65.2	68.0	67.3	41.3	59.5	37.7	49.3	54.0	48.2	50.2	

/...

44. According to the figures published, voters totalled 1,640,729 out of 3,271,155 registered voters, a voter turnout rate of 50.2 per cent. This figure does not give an accurate picture of real voter turnout, because it includes neither votes ruled invalid nor votes which could not be tallied for reasons related to poor organization of data collection and of the calculation of results (illegible or unusable returns; missing or lost BIV documents).

45. According to the OAS/ONUVEH projection, the number of voters must have been between a minimum of 2,044,472 (62.5 per cent turnout) and a maximum of 2,335,605 (71.4 per cent turnout), the most likely figure being 2,188,403, or 66.9 per cent of registered voters. The most likely number of missing votes would thus be 547,674 (a minimum of 403,743 and a maximum of 694,876), of which 153,188 would be blank or invalid votes (a minimum of 116,608 and a maximum of 196,956) and 394,486 would be untallied votes (a minimum of 287,735 and a maximum of 497,920).

46. It is not possible, with the projection model used, to try to break down the data by department. However, it appears that Ouest and the Artibonite were the departments where the most votes went untallied because of missing or illegible returns. This bears out the findings made when the calculation of the results was being observed. It would appear from the information gathered on the basis of the sample selected that the missing votes did not alter the results of the presidential and Senate races, and that their impact was for the most part uncertain. There is no evidence of fraudulent intent and the prevailing impression is that, at least in Quest department, the candidate who suffered most from this situation was Mr. Aristide, who could have obtained one or two percentage points more if the ballot count had been more efficient.

47. For the election of deputies, the majority required by the Electoral Act is, of course, an absolute majority of the ballots (art. 51); and although the Act is not explicit in this regard, it is clearly in keeping with the intent of articles 111 and 112 to assimilate the ballots to the votes cast. On 15 December, the CEP issued its fourth press communiqué, reminding voters "that an absolute majority of the votes is required to elect the President of the Republic and senators and deputies. This absolute majority is calculated on the basis of the total number of voters, that is, the total number of ballot-papers actually placed in the corresponding ballot-boxes for each of these elections". Although this statement is clear, the CEP opted, in the case of deputies, for a very "flexible" criterion: only the votes cast in favour of candidates were counted, and blank and invalid ballots were excluded. If the CEP had applied the "strict" criterion of its fourth press communiqué, a proportion of blank or invalid ballots below 5 per cent would, in a few cases, have changed the absolute majority into a relative majority and, consequently, required another round of balloting. It should be recalled that this "flexible" criterion had been applied also in the presidential election, where it had had no impact because of the very large majority received by Mr. Aristide.

48. For the election of senators, the Act also refers to an absolute majority of the votes. In the case of senators, as of deputies, it is easy to calculate the total number of valid ballots, whereas some theoretical questions can come up in a calculation of the majority. The "flexible" criterion applied in the other two elections could again have been the one followed. In the case of senators,

however, the CEP, using a different reasoning, came back to the strict criterion of its fourth press communiqué: an absolute majority of the voters. Since the CEP could not calculate the total number of voters, it used another figure to define the absolute majority in the senatorial elections, namely, the number of valid ballots cast for the presidential candidates in each department.

49. There are several reasons why "partially blank ballots" are frequent in senatorial elections: the high rate of illiteracy, the lagging civic education campaign and the fact that, in a number of electoral districts, the most popular political parties put forward only one or two candidates. The following table gives estimates of the numbers of blank ballots:

Department	Ballots for the President	Total ballots for the senators if each voter for the President had voted for three candidates	Valid ballots for the senators	Estimate of partially blank ballots Total	%
Sud-Est	146 947	440 841	227 898	212 943	48.3
Nord	177 002	531 006	281 210	249 796	47.0
Nord-Est	64 885	194 655	111 769	82 886	42.6
Centre	148 838	446 514	267 975	178 539	40.0
Grande-Anse	194 470	583 410	351 814	231 596	39.7
Nord-Ouest	71 198	213 594	115 115	98 479	46.1
Sud	200 466	601 398	284 681	316 537	52.6
Artibonite	181 562	544 686	375 616	169 070	31.0
Ouest	460 361	1 381 293	1 111 836	269 457	19.5

As the table above indicates, the large number of blank ballots makes it extremely difficult to obtain an absolute majority: only three senators in Ouest department - where Mr. Aristide carried more than 80 per cent of the votes - and one senator in the Artibonite were elected in the first round.

50. As we have already pointed out, owing to the lack of electoral materials, additional legislative elections had to be held on 6 January in nine electoral districts. Observer teams were assigned to all the districts in question. No incidents were reported and voting went smoothly. However, as is often the case with legislative elections, voter participation was significantly lower.

B. Final results of the first round of the legislative elections

51. The final results of the first round of the legislative elections - including the additional elections of 6 January - were published on 12 January. Five senators and 41 deputies were elected, distributed as follows among the various political parties: FNCD, five senators and 20 deputies; ANDP, 13 deputies; Parti agricole industriel national (PAIN), two deputies; Mouvement pour la reconstruction nationale (MRN), Mouvement démocratique de libération (MODELH-PRDH), Parti démocrate chrétien haïtien (PDCH), Mouvement démocratique national (MDN) and Rassemblement des démocrates nationaux progressistes (RDNP), one deputy each; and one independent deputy.

52. In conclusion, with regard to the vote proper, the first round of the elections can be said to have taken place without major incident. ONUVEH observers formed the opinion that the Haitian people had been able to vote in freedom and safety, without pressures of any kind. Their determination and undeniable courage had been rewarded. For the first time in their country's history, they seemed to have participated in genuine, democratic elections, something of which they could be justly proud. Such a positive assessment cannot be made of the transport of ballot-papers and the tallying of the vote, which gave rise to many problems and irregularities. The reasoning used to determine the various majorities reflected rather the constraints imposed by the availability of information than the specific provisions of the Electoral Act. Even so, it is still perfectly obvious that the problems stemmed from lack of experience and inadequate planning of the voting operations rather than deliberate fraud. Given the very large majority received by the President-elect and - in the case of the legislative elections - the fact that a second round had to be held, the politicians and the observers preferred "to turn the page", without lingering over the criteria selected or the many problems created by the less-than-perfect organization of the first round of the legislative elections.

VI. FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND ROUND OF THE ELECTIONS

A. The political impact of the presidential election

53. The overwhelming majority of votes for the candidate of the FNCD and the virtually immediate recognition of this victory by both the international community and the Haitian political forces created a calmer political climate than had been expected in view of the campaign speeches. Thus, the popular demonstrations of 17 December were entirely peaceful.

54. The victory also opened up a series of new perspectives and considerations. The distrust which had traditionally separated society from the army was partially overcome, as it became clear that the army had guaranteed the security which had enabled Haiti to hold its first free and truly democratic elections. In addition, the old-style political parties found the number of their supporters greatly reduced and had to consider other patterns of alliances for the second round. Some parties immediately erdorsed the candidates in the legislative elections who were backed by the President-elect. This attitude is not unrelated to the relative

apathy shown by the voters in the second round. Finally, the organization of the transitional period and the transfer of power to a new administration made it possible to reactivate such an institution as the Council of State.

B. The putsch of 7 January 1991

55. The holiday season and the nature of the debates initiated gave Haitian political life a calm and peaceful cast until the night of 6 January, when Dr. Roger Lafontant, a candidate excluded from the presidential race, seized the provisional President, Mrs. Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, and forced her to resign in order to take her place. The main objective of the coup d'etat, which did not directly cause any casualties, was to call the elections and their results into question. The strong reaction of the population and its mobilization in urban centres upon the announcement of the act, and the condemnation of the act by the military high command, immediately isolated the rebels. At the international level, the diplomatic community unanimously rejected this self-proclaimed authority. For its part, ONUVEH reaffirmed that the elections of 16 December had been free and democratic and that nothing could change their results.

56. In the early hours of Monday, 7 January, the army regained control of the presidential palace, arrested the person responsible for the attempted coup and his accomplices and reinstated the provisional President in her functions. Demonstrations continued in the streets of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, accompanied by confrontations between Dr. Lafontant's partisans and the population, which resulted in more than 70 deaths and numerous injuries. It was on this day that unruly elements attacked the residence of the papal nuncio. Scenes of pillage also took place in the capital. Given the risk of further deterioration of the situation, which would have gravely affected the atmosphere of freedom and tolerance necessary to the successful completion of the second round of elections, moral and political authorities launched an appeal for calm and in the ensuing days life in the towns returned to normal.

57. Owing to the restraint of the armed forces, of the authorities in place and of the President-elect, the number of casualties was relatively limited. Nevertheless, the attempted coup d'état awakened the distrust of a large segment of the population, which was troubled by the complicity which the rebels were suspected of enjoying with members of certain sectors of the army, as well as by the lukewarm character of the official inquiry. This distrust will weigh on the country's political future unless a diligent and systematic inquiry is promptly conducted and its conclusions are followed up by legal action.

58. Owing to Lafontant's attempted coup d'état and to the ensuing events, the election campaign for the second round was practically non-existent. However, the putsch and the reactions it provoked are not entirely to blame for this. Even before the first round of elections, campaigning by the political parties had been fairly low-key and had concerned, for the most part, only the candidates for the presidency.

VII. THE SECOND ROUND

A. Organization of the second round

59. The electoral system benefited from the experience of the first round of elections. Even though the final list of the elections to be organized and of the remaining candidates could not be sent to the printers until 12 January and the ballot-papers were not made available to the BEDs until a day or two before the elections, electoral materials were distributed to even the most remote areas. Once again, the Council was able to make use of helicopters on loan from the Haitian Armed Forces and the Jamaican Air Force, as well as an additional helicopter obtained through IFES. In each region, ONUVEH electoral observer teams were asked to help distribute electoral materials in the two days preceding the elections. Some 25 ONUVEH vehicles helped to distribute more than 20 per cent of the ballot-papers.

B. Characteristics of the second round of elections

60. On 20 January, a second round of balloting was held for 22 seats in the Senate and 42 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Local elections were held on the same day in 33 communes and almost 140 communal sections. In the elections for the legislature, 120 candidates representing 11 political parties, as well as six independent candidates, were vying for the ballots of voters in all of the country's departments.

C. Activities of ONUVEH during the second round

61. There were about 100 ONUVEH observers, not counting about 20 members of the logistical staff. In addition to security observers, they included Secretariat officials, volunteers recruited from among the experts of the United Nations and of non-governmental organizations assigned to Haiti, and observers sent for the occasion by the Governments of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

62. Divided into 48 teams, the electoral observers were deployed in the country's nine departments and visited more than 1,200 polling stations, or almost 10 per cent of the total number of BIVs. The security observers fulfilled their function by observing the implementation of security plans.

D. Conduct of the second round of elections

63. The reports submitted by the regional ONUVEH offices show that an adequate distribution of electoral materials was undertaken, although electoral rolls were lacking in some places. In others, the BIVs did not have secondary materials, or sometimes were lacking such essential materials as polling-booths or ballot-papers. In the latter case, observer teams were able to co-operate, in the course of the day, in solving the difficulties encountered. Some irregularities

were discovered, such as stuffing of ballot-boxes and intimidation of voters or candidates. These very isolated incidents, about 10 in all, were brought to the attention of the electoral authorities to enable them to take appropriate measures.

64. On the whole, the second round took place in a satisfactory manner. The rate of participation was certainly low, which is regrettable in view of the importance of these elections, but the voters had the opportunity to express their choice freely in an atmosphere of complete security.

65. In some districts, however, the elections could not take place because of problems relating to the printing of ballot-papers or the lack of essential voting materials. Thus, CASEC elections were postponed until 27 January in 10 communal sections. In the small town of Rivière de Nippes, elections were also held on 27 January for municipal officials and for the CASECs of the second and third communal sections. In the small town of Trou de Nippes, legislative elections could not be organized because all of the candidates had been eliminated by the CEP. The CEP therefore prepared a special schedule for this town according to which the first round of legislative elections was held on 3 February and the second on 6 February.

E. Criteria used for the attribution of seats in the National Assembly

66. Neither the Constitution nor the law clearly specifies the type of majority required in the second round, merely limiting the number of remaining candidates to two per seat. This lack of precision has no effect on the final results if the majority is calculated on the basis of valid ballots alone. In this case, the absolute majority coincides with the relative majority. On the other hand, if blank or invalid ballot-papers are taken into account, there may be cases in which neither of the two candidates receives an absolute majority. The question then arises as to whether the candidate elected is the one who obtained the most votes in the second round, or whether, in the absence of a winner, the results of the first round should be considered final and the victory should be awarded to the candidate who obtained the relative majority in the first round.

67. Without entering into a legal debate, which would be out of place in this report, let us simply note that the CEP applied different rules to the election of deputies and to that of senators. For deputies, only valid ballot-papers were considered, whereas for senators, not only was the total number of ballot-papers considered, but the absolute majority of votes was required, as in the first round. Thus, four senators were declared elected on the basis of the results of the first round, even though two of them had been greatly outdistanced by their rivals in the second round. For the future, therefore, efforts to clear up the ambiguities of the law would be desirable.

F. The final results of the legislative elections

68. According to the final results, the composition of the National Assembly and the distribution of the communal councils are as follows:

Parties	Senators	Deputies	Total Assembly	Communal councils
Alliance nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès	6	17	23	37
Front national pour le changement et la démocratie	13	27	40	42
Mouvement démocratique national	--	5	5	6
Mouvement démocratique de libération	--	2	2	2
Mouvement koumbite national	--	2	2	--
Mouvement pour la reconstruction nationale	2	1	3	1
Parti agricole industriel national	2	7	9	6
Parti démocrate chrétien haïtien	1	7	8	9
Parti national du travail	1	3	4	5
Rassemblement des démocrates nationaux progressistes	1	6	7	4
Union pour la réconciliation nationale	--	1	1	--
Indépendent	1	5	6	18
Total	27	83	110	130

VIII. FINAL EVALUATION

A. Overall evaluation of the elections in Haiti

69. In its first report to the General Assembly (A/45/870, annex), which covered the period up to 14 December 1990, ONUVEH had decided that the first phase of the Haitian electoral process had made good progress. No doubt there had been some irregularities during the voter registration but measures had been taken to prevent anyone from casting more than one vote. Moreover, many candidates had been excluded from the electoral race owing to the rigorous application of very detailed legal provisions, without the CEP being in a position to allow them the overtime necessary for completing their files. The remaining contenders, however, had represented all the trends of opinion and the choice had therefore remained very open. The election campaign had been marked by a complete freedom of expression and assembly, the impartiality of the governmental, military and electoral authorities and the absence of violence, except for the attack of 5 December at Pétion-Ville which had not seriously undermined confidence in the elections. That report had concluded by expressing the hope that the outcome of the campaign would be peaceful, honest and credible elections.

70. Although the first round of the general elections in Haiti had been marked by many irregularities, there had been no violence or intimidation. Most often the irregularities observed had been caused by the difficulties in organizing the balloting in a country which suffers bitterly from a lack of transport and communication facilities and had scarcely any experience in electoral activities. The ONUVEH observers did not detect any sign of fraudulent intent or any trace suggestion of planned action. In the case of the presidential election, the irregularities were not of a kind likely to cast doubt on the final result, so overwhelming was the triumph of Mr. Aristide. As regards the legislative elections, the winners in the first round had also gained large majorities, which more than compensated for the irregularities and difficulties found here and there.

71. As there were many vacant seats both in the Senate (22) and in the Chamber of Deputies (42), a second round had to be organized and was held on 20 January. The experience of 16 December had borne fruit and the second round was much better organized than the first. Admittedly, the absence of electoral rolls or certain types of materials was sometimes noted. Some irregularities, immediately notified to the electoral authorities, were also noted. On the whole, however, it can be said that this second round proceeded in favourable conditions, even though the low rate of participation was disappointing. Once again the voters had been able to vote freely and without fear for the candidates of their choice.

72. Although all of the seats in the Senate were filled on 20 January, one seat in the Chamber of Deputies remained to be filled in the department of Grande-Anse. An additional election therefore took place on 3 February, after the candidates had been duly registered. With two candidates still in contention, one from the PAIN and the other from the PNT, a second round was held on 6 February, in which the candidate of the PAIN gained the victory.

73. The calculation of the results gave rise to problems owing to ambiguities in the law, which does not define the concept of expressed votes or the type of majority required in the second round, and to the difficulty of gathering certain data. The CEP was led to apply different interpretations of the law to different elections, which, as a rule, had no effect on the selection of candidates. In two cases, however, candidates to the Senate who had obtained three times fewer votes than their rivals in the second round were declared elected on the basis of the results of the first round.

74. In spite of the above-mentioned problems involving logistics, organizations and calculation of results, no doubt was cast on the impartiality of the electoral authorities. The members of the CEP were no doubt lacking in experience but they showed great courage in agreeing to assume responsibility for a delicate mission and in carrying it out without being intimidated by the threats levelled against them throughout the electoral process.

75. At the outset, security of the elections had been the principal unknown, but it was provided beyond reproach by the Haitian Armed Forces. The CCSAE discharged its heavy responsibilities by devising, with the assistance of the two ONUVEH experts, a national security plan for the election days. This plan was supplemented by local measures. With the assistance of the ONUVEH security observers who, by their presence, helped to reassure the population and encouraged the dialogue between the civil, especially the electoral, authorities and the military authorities, the army largely regained the confidence of the Haitians, who were not afraid to cast their ballots and who congratulated it on its professionalism.

B. The need to establish a sound electoral system

76. These 1990-1991 elections were only a first step on the road of democracy which Haiti has chosen. In 1992, new elections will be held for renewing one third of the Senate. In 1994, steps must be taken for renewing a second third of the Senate, the entire Chamber of Deputies and all the councils of the communes and communal sections. Therefore, the Haitian authorities will soon face the necessity of training the staff of the Permanent Electoral Council to be established, preparing a permanent electoral register linked to an improved civil file, providing each voter with a suitable civil-electoral document and launching a civil education campaign on the importance of the parliament and local authorities. The international community cannot but share their concern for building an effective electoral system.

Notes

1/ These figures do not reflect the fact that candidates were absent in a few electoral districts.

2/ This is the expression used in the case of the presidential elections. As regards the elections to the Senate, the Constitution refers to "universal suffrage by absolute majority". As regards the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, it refers to "the absolute majority of the votes cast". In the case of the communes and the communal sections, the Constitution merely states that the elections are "by universal suffrage".

ANNEX I

Nationalities represented in the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti a/

1. Overall list of nationalities represented

Algeria
Argentina
Belgium
Benin
Brazil
Burundi
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Colombia
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Denmark
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gambia
Germany
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
Norway
Peru
Portugal
Saint Lucia
Senegal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Uganda
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Viet Nam
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Total: 50

2. List by geographical region

Africa	Asia	Europe	North America	Latin America and the Caribbean
Algeria	Japan	Belgium	Canada	Argentina
Benin	Malaysia	Denmark	United States of America	Brazil
Burundi	Viet Nam	Finland		Colombia
Cape Verde		France		Costa Rica
Central African Republic		Germany		El Salvador
Chad		Italy		Mexico
Côte d'Ivoire		Netherlands		Peru
Egypt		Norway		Saint Lucia
Equatorial Guinea		Portugal		Trinidad and Tobago
Ethiopia		Spain		
Gambia		Sweden		
Mali		Switzerland		
Mauritius		Union of Soviet Socialist Republics		
Morocco		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland		
Senegal		Yugoslavia		
South Africa				
Tunisia				
Uganda				
Zaire				
Zambia				
Zimbabwe				
21	3	15	2	9

Total: 50

a/ These lists include the observers of both rounds, regardless of their origin.

ANNEX II

I. United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti: form used for observing the balloting (first round)

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1. General information

1.1 BIV code |_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_| 1.2 Observer code |_|

1.3 Opening time of BIV ..... 1.4 Time of visit to BIV .....

1.5 Number registered ..... 1.6 Number of voters .....

2. Constitution of BIV

2.1 BIV members present

All |_| A | Absence of chairman |_| B | Absence of secretary |_| C | Absence of clerks |_| D | Absence of door attendant |_| E

2.2 Parties represented

None |_| A | ANDP |_| B | FNCD |_| C | Others |_| D | Who? .....

2.3 Degree of normality in the constitution of the BIV

Normal |_| A | Minor difficulties |_| B | Major difficulties |_| C

In the case of major difficulties, specify .....

.....

.....

3. Electoral material

Material complete [A] Secondary material missing [B] Essential material missing [C]

If essential material is missing, specify .....
.....
.....

4. Use of indelible ink

Used [ ] Not used [ ]

5. Volume of votes

5.1 Estimated number of voters waiting to vote

Under 20 [A] Between 21 and 50 [B] More than 50 [C]

5.2 Voting time per voter

1 to 3 mins. [A] 3 to 5 mins. [B] 5 to 10 mins. [C] More than 10 mins. [D]

5.3 Number of voters inside BIV

One [A] Two [B] Three [C] More than three [D]

Comments on voting procedures .....
.....
.....

6. Secrecy of the ballot

No interference [A] Violation of secrecy of the ballot [B]

In the case of violation of secrecy, explain .....
.....
.....

7. Free expression of choice in voting

Cases of intimidation

None, or none reported [A] Not noted but reported [B] Noted [C]

In the case of intimidation, explain .....
.....
.....

8. Observer's assessment of the regularity of the vote at the BIV visited

Normal [A] Irregular with minor incidents [B] Serious irregularity compromising the results at the BIV [C]

Observations .....
.....
.....
.....
.....

II. United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti: form used for observing the balloting (second round)

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1. BIV code | | | | | | | | |

Observer code .....

Place .....

Opening time of BIV ..... Time of visit ..... Number registered ..... Number of voters .....

2. BIV members present

All | A | Absence of chairman | B | Absence of secretary | C | Absence of clerks | D | Absence of door attendant | E |

3. Parties represented None | A | ANDP | B | FNCD | C | Others | D |

4. Degree of normality in the constitution of the BIV Normal | A | Minor difficulties | B | Major difficulties | C |

5. Electoral material Complete | A | Secondary missing | B | Essential missing | C |

If essential material is missing, specify .....

6. Use of indelible ink Used | A | Not used | B |

7. Number of voters waiting None | A | Under 20 | B | More than 21 | C |

/...

8. Secrecy of the ballot

No interference [A]

Inadequate placement of polling booth [B]

Interference by party representatives [D]

Party implicated .....

Interference by the BIV authorities [C]

Other interference [E]

Explain .....
.....

9. Free expression of choice in voting

Cases of intimidation

None, or none reported [A]

Not noted but reported [B]

Noted [C]

10. Observer's assessment of the regularity of the vote at the BIV visited

Normal [A]

Irregular with minor incidents [B]

Serious irregularity compromising the results at the BIV [C]

In the case of problems or irregularities, give details on reverse side.